The Devil is in the Details – The Real Screening Report
Part 4 in the CELIS blogseries on the revision of FDI Screening Regulation 2019/452.
Authors: Floor Doppen (University of Antwerp), Andrew Hill (AmCham EU, Brussels)
Introduction
The Commission published its 5th Annual Report on FDI Screening on October 14th (‘the Report’). This report is eagerly awaited every year by many stakeholders as a major source of information on FDI practice statistics and economic data, laying out information on notification numbers, sectoral screening and investment trends, as well as the use of the Cooperation Mechanism.
Accordingly, the Report provides data that helps investors, screeners and observers alike make sense of the practice and potential effects of FDI screening. This data can help you answer questions on broad economic trends (“is investment increasing or decreasing in the energy space?”) and screening trends alike (“has x country’s new regime led to more or less notifications?").
While data like this is vital, the Report is, at present, one of the few places that this type of information is found, especially when it concerns screening activities carried out by the Member States: only some publish guidance on their regimes, much less notification statistics. Gaps in the current Regulation lead to different transparency requirements as well as different practices on the notification of cases to the cooperation mechanism.
Likewise, although the much-anticipated Report provides an interesting perspective on investment trends, the use of aggregate data leads to an incomplete picture. This is problematic and, as this blog will show, the devil is in the details.
This blog will peer beyond the aggregated data in the 2025 Report to show a more nuanced, variegated and complete picture of the state of investment screening in the EU and link it up to changes proposed in the new foreign investment screening regulation.
Muddy waters
As the fDi intelligence noted, an initial reading of the 2024 Report can be daunting: the amount of cases screened in EU Member States surged from 1,808 in 2023 and 1,444 in 2022, to 3,136 in 2024—an overall increase of 73%. These include all cases that fell under mandatory notification regimes, voluntary notifications, and ex officio cases “called in” by an authority. Luckily, the reality is slightly more nuanced.
There are two important things to note. First, a significant number of new FDI regimes came into place in 2023 with their first ‘full year’ numbers only reflected in the latest report. These include the Belgian, Dutch, Estonian, Luxembourgish, Slovakian, Slovenian and Swedish regimes. Naturally, the number of cases notified in 2024 would be higher due to there simply being more foreign investment screening regimes in operation.
Second, the most important evolution relevant to understanding the 2024 report is the inclusion of Sweden’s data. Sweden adopted a broad screening regime and received 1,263 notifications in the entirety of 2024. Without the inclusion of the Swedish cases, the number of overall notifications in the EU would come down to a more realistic 1,873 cases, which fits more with the natural FDI screening trends of the past years. Naturally, the inclusion of outliers in statistical data can lead to a distorted analysis, and this is acknowledged in a footnote in the report.
At the same time, the use of aggregate data misses other vital narratives. One is that although the share of notifications that is formally screened is prima facie down, in reality they are up. Similarly, the use of mitigation is up, even if they are in the report presented as being down.
Procedural variation in the EU: Screening more or less?
Are EU Member States opening more or less formal investigations into notified transactions? The answer is not as straightforward as it may seem.
When looking more closely at the statistics of cases “formally screened,” we need to address what this actually means. “Formally screened” can mean two things depending on the Member State. In some, a case is deemed “formally screened” if, upon voluntary or mandatory notification, the screening authority identifies that it actually triggered the relevant tests necessary to be inspected in a ‘Phase 2’ screening process. In other Member States, all notified cases are formally screened unless otherwise deemed ineligible.
The report buries the lede that the ratio of overall cases to formally screened cases is up, meaning that a larger share of overall cases are formally screened than they were in previous years. Out of the 3,136 cases screened in 2024, only 41% were formally screened. However, if Sweden were excluded from the calculation, the share of cases formally screened would be 67% (a rise when compared to 2023, when 56% of all cases were formally screened). Importantly, while Sweden’s regime requires a significant number of investors to notify, Swedish authorities only subjected 26 cases to in-depth screening, out of the 1,263 notifications (see Table 1).
Excluding Sweden from the data reveals an overall increase in the share of cases formally screened. This increase could signify a number of things.
On the one hand, it could indicate that screening regimes could have become more targeted and efficient overtime, with new entrants, such as the Netherlands, bringing relatively targeted regimes. This could also indicate that increased practice, experience with new regimes, and transparency could also have led to fewer cases being pre-emptively notified, especially in jurisdictions with unclear definitions of scope. This is unlikely for the 2024 data, considering that screening is overall still a very young practice for many Member States.
On the other hand, this increase could also reflect shifting attitudes by governments on economic and investment security, leading them to formally screen a larger portion of notified cases. Similarly, it could signify that regimes that screen every notification formally could have received a larger amount of investments in covered sectors. This is certainly the case for Spain. Unfortunately, it is difficult to assess the cause of the increase in the share of formally screened cases from the data presented in the report.
Table 1 – Overview of the Commission’s annual report data – relative and absolute numbers
| 2023 | 2024 | |
| Total screened cases | ||
| (absolute n°) | 1808 | 3136 |
| Screened cases without the Swedish numbers | ||
| (absolute n°) | NA | 1873 |
| Cases formally screened | ||
| (%) | 56% | 41% |
| (absolute n°) | 1012,48 | 1285,76 |
| Cases formally screened without the Swedish numbers | ||
| (%) | NA | 67% |
| Cases authorized of those formally screened | ||
| (%) | 85% | 86% |
| (absolute n°) | 860 | 1105,1 |
| Cases authorized with conditions | ||
| (%) | 10% | 9% |
| (absolute n°) | 101,2 | 115,65 |
Variation in screening in practice: mitigation measures
A second screening trend advanced in the Report is that while there is an increase in overall cases notified to national screening mechanisms, this increase isn’t necessarily leading to more redressive measures. Of the formally screened cases, the overwhelming majority (86%) were approved and only 9% were authorized with conditions, down from 10% in 2023.
While this seems great, there are some important caveats.
First, the report shows that 2024 saw a slight absolute increase in the use of conditional authorizations, given that the 9% of formally screened cases conditionally approved represents about 115 cases. This is a slight increase from 2023 where out of 1,808 cases, 56% were formally screened, and 10% were approved with conditions, i.e. about 101 cases (Table 1). The absolute increase is not strange overall, and is in line with expectations: more screened cases would mean more conditional approvals.
However, this figure conceals that the practise of imposing mitigating measures varies wildly between Member States in practice, and that there may be inconsistencies between the data presented in the Commission’s report and the member states’. After all, Member States' screening activities data displayed in the annual FDI screening reports is entirely based on member states submissions with respect to Art 5 of the Regulation 2019/452. The Commission does not process the data but aggregates it as individual Member State submissions are confidential.
In general, it is therefore important to read the Member States’ individual reports and the Commission’s reports as complementary as they don't necessarily reflect in every case the same data points.
An analysis of national reports shows that France was responsible for many conditional authorizations in the EU in 2024, with 54% of 182 cases (99 cases) authorized with conditions in 2024, up from 60 cases in 2023. Other member states’ reports show a more temperate and relatively stable practice: Germany imposed mitigating measures on 5% of all screened cases, fluctuating between 12 and 14 cases per year over the past five years, and only 8 in 2024[1]. Italy, with one of the larger shares of overall screened cases, issued 28 conditional authorizations in 2023, and 30 in 2024[2]. In their 2024 data, we observe that the Netherlands imposed mitigation measures in 3 cases, Sweden in 12 cases, and Spain in 8.
Strangely enough, however, the sum of these individually reported numbers already exceed the Commission report’s number of 9% mitigating measures of 41% of formally screened cases of the overall 3,136 cases (or 115 cases according to our calculations based on the current Commission’s annual report). An assessment of reports issued by Member States show that 160 cases were approved with conditions. This does not account for the data several Member States, such as Romania or Austria, who do not have data available and are rumored to have issued more conditional approvals in 2024 than in previous years.
Every year by the 31st of March, Member States are required to submit to the Commission an annual report covering the screening activities of the preceding calendar year. Member States' annual reports (where available) are usually only published in the autumn: this divergence in reporting deadlines might be the cause of the divergence. Since the negotiation of mitigating measures of cases of the preceding calendar year might only be formally concluded after the Commission's reporting deadline, the data communicated to the Commission might be incomplete. This could be one explanation for the divergence.
Regardless of the reason for the divergence, looking at these individual reports, it is clear that the use of mitigating measures by Member States in 2024 is significantly up from 2023, which is not reflected in the Commission's annual report.
Table 2: Overview of adoption of mitigating measures
| 2023 | 2024 | |||
| Total cases | mitigated | Total cases | mitigated | |
| Austria | 103 cases | 5 | Will come out in December | |
| Belgium | 2023-2024: 68 cases | ? | 2024-2025: 100 cases | 1 |
| Bulgaria | Operational since 22 July 2025 | |||
| Croatia | Draft Proposal publish in September 2025 | |||
| Cyprus | Screening bill was recently passed by the House of Representatives (30 October 2025) | |||
| Czechia | 28 cases | 0 | Will come out in December | ? |
| Denmark | No report | |||
| Estonia | Entered into force 1 september 2023 | 5 cases accepted, 15 supervisory cases | ? | |
| Finland | 38 cases | ? | 31 cases | ? |
| France | 309 cases | 60 | 392 cases | 99 |
| Germany | 257 cases | 12 | 261 cases | 8* |
| Greece | Entered into force 23 May 2025 | |||
| Hungary | No report | |||
| Ireland | Entered into force 6 January 2025 | |||
| Italy | 577 | 28 | 660 | 30 |
| Latvia | No report found, but might still be prepared for data from 2024 | |||
| Lithuania | No report | |||
| Luxembourg | No report | |||
| Malta | No report | |||
| Netherlands | 55 cases | 1 | 69 cases | 3 |
| Poland | No report | |||
| Portugal | No report | |||
| Romania | No report | |||
| Slovakia | 11 cases | 0 | Report not found | |
| Slovenia | No report | |||
| Spain | 97 cases | 8 | 136 cases | 8 |
| Sweden | Entered into force 1 December 2023 | 1263 cases | 12 | |
Cooperation mechanism
The uncertainty about conditional approval statistics reflects a wider issue that there is no harmonized practice on what statistics Member States need to notify to the Commission or publish in annual reports, and that many Member States simply do not publish data or guidance in general.
The 2019 Regulation leaves significant leeway to Member States to determine what they notify to the Cooperation Mechanism. This has led Member States to adopt significantly varying practices. Austria and Italy, for example, notify all cases they receive to the cooperation mechanism before an in-depth risk assessment (provided they are eligeble for notification), while France and Germany only notify those after the risk assessment, i.e. those that enter phase 2.
The result is a significant imbalance in what data is available, and what the data actually means. The Court of Auditors pointed out that only six Member States were responsible for 92% of all cases notified to the Cooperation Mechanism, despite only being responsible for 22% of the average inward investment stock at the time. This trend seems to hold for the 2024 data, with a total of 477 notifications submitted to the cooperation mechanism, with four member states responsible for 76% of notifications (Spain, Austria, Italy, France).
While these four countries represent a large share of the cases submitted to the Cooperation Mechanism, this does not mean that these states are necessarily the ones that screen to most cases: Spain received 147 cases in total in 2024 and most likely notified most of them to the cooperation mechanism, since they have a one-phase screening regime. Germany on the other hand, received 261 notifications/cases in 2024, and only opened a phase 2 review in 18 of them. Since Germany only notifies phase 2 cases to the cooperation mechanism, this leads to a very skewed reading of the data in the annual report as it relates to the Cooperation Mechanism. France does filter its cases, but also receives many notifications, leading it to proportionally notify more to the Cooperation Mechanism. Austria on the other hand, with 103 cases in 2023 (the report on the 2024 data is not out yet), is a heavy weight for the same reasons as Spain because they most likely notify more into the Cooperation Mechanism, even if they do have a two phase approach like Germany.
A bridge over muddy water?
Transparency in the FDI context generally relates to two things: First, statistical data allows researchers to understand broader economic trends and helps investors to evaluate risks and screening trends. Second, guidelines and other interpretive documents help investors decipher often complex rules and help screening teams create standards. The forthcoming Foreign Investment Screening Regulation (‘new Regulation’) will likely take steps towards increasing the availability of statistical data and, to a lesser extent, guidance.
First, some of the difficulty in interpreting the data from the Commission report is largely the result of different procedures in different Member States, especially the variation between regimes with two screening phases and those with just one. The revision is set to align this procedure, advancing that all Member States adopt a two-phase screening procedure (Art. 4, 2(a)). The Council mandate specifies the new provision, increasing the likelihood that screening processes will be more harmonized over time across Member States. Data from the various Member States will accordingly become more comparable over time.
Second, on the harmonization of notifications to the Cooperation Mechanism, Art. 4 2(i) of the new Regulation requires Member States to provide adequate resources to the Cooperation Mechanism in line with Art. 5. This section provides an overall clear overview of which cases that have to be notified to the Cooperation Mechanism, and overall, the Council’s mandate follows the Commission’s proposal with the inclusion of a few clarifications. In short, the future looks more harmonized on this particular point.
The new Regulation will also include a more robust database on the outcome of screening decisions. The Commission’s proposal included Art. 7(10) which would establish a database on the outcome of assessments under national screening mechanisms and cases notified to the Cooperation Mechanism. The Council’s mandate added substantial detail to this particular section, moving it to its own article (Art. 16a).
Lastly, the Commission’s proposal included a provision requiring Member States to publish annual reports on investment screening, including information on relevant legislative developments in the member state and, most importantly, aggregate data on cases, including the outcome of screening decisions (Art. 4(2)(f)). The Council
Although it is unlikely that public reporting standards for investment screening in annual reports will be fully aligned across the EU, steps are being taken. Absent full alignment, it will be up to the Commission or Member States to informally align their reporting methods until the next legislative revision of the Regulation.
Conclusion: the importance of transparency
Transparency is sine qua non for a democratically functioning society and is necessary for foreign investment screening to comply with rule of law principles.
As the 2024 Report shows, the lack of standardized reporting requirements can significantly muddy interpretation for researchers and hinder investors’ ability to understand vital screening trends.
The new Regulation, and the ubiquity and maturity of investment screening mechanism across the EU, will contribute to the quality and availability of this information. However, there is still room to grow in terms of transparency in the fields of further guidance and stakeholder engagement, as the Parliament and recent discussions at the CFIS 2025 Conference revealed.
As investment screening evolves from a nascent screening mechanism into a hallmark of transaction screening, alongside merger control, screening authorities will be under increasing pressure to help investors and researchers alike understand what and how they are screening and mitigating. These discussions are certain to continue as the new Regulation is implemented and as lawmakers prepare for its eventual review.
Stay tuned for our next blog post where we will debrief on the CFIS 2025 conference!
[1] This number will likely change since this is based on numbers from 31 January 2025. As of that date there were still 19 cases filed in 2024 and one in 2023 that were not yet closed.
[2] These numbers are based on the sum of the ‘esercizio poteri speciali con prescrizioni/condizioni’ and the ‘approvazione piano annual 5G con prescrizioni/condizioni’ in the Italian annual screening report.
