Authorities at the helm – Developing investment screening capabilities in Belgium – An interview with Anne Bonet
Part 1 in the CELIS blogseries ‘Authorities at the helm’
Author: Floor Doppen
Introduction
In the European Union (‘EU’), investment screening regulation has proliferated in the past five years. Many member states developed new administrative capabilities, struggled to develop the governance capabilities to screen investments efficiently, were tasked with explaining to colleagues, firms, lawyers and academia alike what investment screening is, what kind of security concerns it tackles, which sectors are or are not covered or what the role of the European Commission is.
Others with already established regimes were faced with widened scopes of application, saw their workload increase exponentially, were tasked with aligning existing regimes with EU Regulation, and increased their cooperative efforts with other member states and the Commission.
All of this is not surprising to most; books, reports, and plenty of blogs have been written about investment screening in the past few years, by political scientists, legal scholars & practitioners, journalists, and of course by the CELIS Institute. All these works analyse investment screening from a stakeholder or a research perspective, and understandably may fail to reflect the ‘reality on the ground’. So what about the stories of the people at the helm of screening authorities, tasked with implementing and navigating all of these regulatory shifts?
We have invited a variety of current and former screening authority officials to talk about their experiences in drafting, implementing, and building the institutional infrastructures of the proverbial ‘investment screening revolution’, on the eve of the expected adoption of a new EU Regulation for foreign investment screening.
Their stories encompass many facets: from difficult political discussions (who will decide and be consulted in these assessments?) to small practical frustrations (do we have a database for this?), to funny stories and important wins. We seek to highlight and bring to the fore not the legal analysis, but highlight the inherently human nature of the abstract policies that obscure the personalities and people implementing these tools.
For this first introductory blogpost we introduce Anne Bonet, former head of the federal Investment Screening Committee, and current advisor to the board of the CELIS Institute. Anne is credited with setting up the Belgian investment screening regime following the adoption of the Belgian Samenwerkingsakkoord that laid down the new investment screening rules in Belgium and that entered into force on the 1st of July 2023. She stood at the cradle of investment screening in Belgium, and has sharp insights into the challenges, joys, and bureaucratic compromises that happen behind the scenes of one of the most complex screening regimes in terms of competence allocation in the world!
So, Anne, how have you seen investment screening evolve in the past 3 years?
From skepticism to relief
When the Belgian investment screening mechanism was first implemented, it was largely perceived as an unnecessary additional administrative burden, comparable to —and sometimes confused with— existing competition procedures. The lawyers involved in FDI notifications were usually not those supporting the transaction in M&A departments, but rather, competition lawyers, often described as being “good at filling out forms”.
At that early stage, the main concern among practitioners and investors was the risk of lengthy procedures and potentially negative decisions that could jeopardize transactions or discourage foreign investment in Belgium.
Three years on, these concerns have not materialized. Cases are handled within the statutory deadlines, Belgium has not developed a practice of refusing investments, and the approach to mitigation measures has remained proportionate and pragmatic. The Screening Authority has successfully established a constructive dialogue with legal practitioners, allowing for smoother procedures, effective information exchange, and faster convergence towards preliminary assessments.
This evolution has contributed to reframing investment screening as a risk-management instrument rather than a blocking mechanism, which has been essential in building trust among stakeholders.
From indifference to growing interest
Three years ago, economic security was widely recognized as an important concept, but its meaning remained vague and fragmented. Some stakeholders associated it primarily with economic crime, others with defense-related industries, while many admitted they did not clearly understand what it entailed. The notion of the “weaponization of the economy” was not perceived as a tangible risk: Chinese investments were largely viewed through the lens of growth opportunities, and the United States, under the Biden administration, was still perceived as a stable and predictable ally.
Several developments have profoundly changed this perception, and these assumptions no longer fully hold. First, the Russian aggression against Ukraine, initially seen by many as a conventional military conflict, has revealed the extent of hybrid threats, including the intensive use of drones and cyberattacks.
Second, the mercurial US stance towards Europe has forced the EU to reassess the foundations of the transatlantic relationship. As a result, the need to strengthen EU strategic autonomy and secure critical value chains has become more evident. Economic security is now increasingly understood as a condition for preserving the EU’s capacity to define its own policies and defend its values in an increasingly contested global environment.
What are the biggest challenges you have tackled in implementing investment screening?
It took three years of negotiations between the federal and federated governments to agree on the adoption of a national FDI screening mechanism. These discussions resulted in a cooperation agreement aligned with Regulation (EU) 2019/452, but one that initially lacked detailed operational guidance.
In addition, the ten administrations involved in the mechanism were granted only six months to make it fully operational. To my knowledge, the Belgian mechanism is unique in granting federated entities decision-making power on an equal footing with the federal level.
Starting from scratch, we had to build operational cooperation and fill the gaps left by the legal framework. This involved developing an IT tool, designing workflows, recruiting staff with the appropriate profiles, agreeing on working methods with nine other administrations where the law was silent, and communicating with stakeholders to ensure readiness for the go-live date.
These processes required not only technical expertise but also a significant degree of trust-building, diplomacy, and resilience, particularly in the face of institutional tensions and external pressure.
Despite these challenges, the circumstances ultimately helped foster mutual confidence among the members of the Screening Committee, even where interests might have diverged. To date, the Committee has consistently acted as a unified body and adopted coherent positions towards investors. This institutional cohesion is, in my view, a key factor in the efficiency and credibility of the Belgian screening mechanism, as it allows both federal and regional interests to be secured simultaneously.
What is the most common miscomprehension you have heard or faced in your work?
During the first year of implementation, one of the most frequent misunderstandings concerned the relationship between FDI screening and competition law. Many stakeholders assumed that approval by competition authorities, or the absence of market distortion, would automatically imply clearance under the screening mechanism.
It was therefore necessary to repeatedly explain that competition assessments were not relevant to FDI screening, which is based on security-related considerations. The absence of objective, predefined criteria enabling lawyers to assess the likelihood of a screening decision was also difficult to accept. This tension was understandable, as public administrations are generally expected to act in a transparent and predictable manner.
At the same time, the screening mechanism was entirely new, involved the potential use of classified information, and required case-by-case geopolitical and geoeconomic analysis. In response, the Screening Committee published guidelines even before the mechanism entered into force, in order to clarify its interpretation of the law. These guidelines have since been updated regularly, including to reflect the Committee’s position on legal questions raised by practitioners.
Another recurrent misunderstanding I observed, particularly in my role as President of the Screening Committee, relates to the divergence between the Committee’s reasoning — grounded in geoeconomic risk — and that of target companies, which focus primarily on growth opportunities and commercial strategy. This often led to the perception of unjustified public interference in private business decisions.
As the direct interlocutors of the Screening Committee are mainly the lawyers representing investors, I found it frustrating that it was difficult to raise awareness of economic security issues directly among CEOs at the Belgian level. This highlights the need for broader economic security literacy beyond the legal community, particularly among corporate leadership.
What do you think will change in investment screening in the next 2–5 years?
In the context of escalating geopolitical tensions, increased scrutiny of foreign investments affecting security or public order is to be expected, together with a more systematic use of risk-mitigating measures by screening authorities. This evolution reflects a gradual consolidation of a risk-based approach, focusing on the assessment of potential vulnerabilities linked to specific investors, ownership structures, and sensitive activities.
Investors and EU companies can anticipate this trend by integrating economic security considerations at an early stage of their investment planning and transaction structuring. Screening authorities, for their part, will need to further strengthen their sectoral and technological expertise in order to design mitigation measures that are targeted, proportionate, and legally robust, while preserving the EU’s openness to foreign direct investment.
In the medium term, investment screening is likely to evolve from a predominantly procedural notification mechanism into a more mature and structured policy instrument. It will require enhanced analytical capacities within public administrations, as well as a more anticipatory and transparent dialogue with economic operators.
This development will be supported by the forthcoming EU regulation, whose text has been agreed between the Council and the European Parliament. Beyond establishing a common scope of sectors and activities subject to screening, the regulation strengthens the EU cooperation mechanism by enabling national screening authorities to request analytical support from the European Commission and by facilitating more systematic information-sharing among member states. Transparency and coordination within this cooperation framework will therefore be significantly reinforced.
For Belgium, the European Commission has long been a trusted partner for information-sharing and capacity-building, notably through technical guidance and informal exchanges. The possibility of formally involving Commission services in national screening procedures could facilitate complex assessments and contribute to the further development of national expertise. In parallel, increased transparency from other member states will improve the understanding of their respective risk assessments and security concerns, thereby strengthening mutual trust and cooperation. From this perspective, I expect cross-border investment projects likely to benefit from a more coherent and predictable application of FDI screening rules across the Union.
